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**Review of: Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Education. Ed. by
Günter Zöllner and Robert B. Loudon. Transl. by Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer,
Robert B. Loudon, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöllner, and Arnulf
Zweig**

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Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Education. Ed. by **Günter Zöllner** and **Robert B. Loudon**. Transl. by Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Robert B. Loudon, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöllner, and Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. [The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation]. xvi, 597 pp. ISBN 978-0-521-18121-1.

Kant touched on various aspects of the question of human nature in much of his writing, though he dealt with specific issues pertaining to the study of the human being only in a limited number of pieces. Much of this material came up in one form or another in Kant's course, *Vorlesungen über Anthropologie*, that he taught on a regular basis during most of his academic career (1772–1796), although his writings on this subject matter span an even longer period of time. The volume under review contains seventeen pieces which deal more or less directly with the study of human nature and which were published between 1764 and 1803, starting with the pre-critical period and ending shortly before Kant's death; it unites writings that are scattered throughout the academy edition.

More than almost any other volume of the Cambridge Edition, the present one highlights some of the advantages and disadvantages of the organizational criteria of this series. There is obviously much benefit to be derived from having Kant's writings grouped topically, rather than just having them ordered chronologically, regardless of their subject matter, as was, at least in part, the practice of the academy edition. The difficulties arise from the fact that selection along topical lines is often anything but easy. Kant's writings do not always fit neatly into the academic disciplines of his days nor into the areas delineated by his three *Critiques*, and many a short piece touches on different unrelated topics. Any grouping of Kant's works will thus be to some extent arbitrary, and will be saddled by inevitable drawbacks. In the present case, the problems stem from the fact that the science of human nature or the study of the human being are not clearly defined fields. The editors were not unaware of this; Loudon notes that Kant's study of human nature is "an eclectic venture revealing multiple origins, competing concerns and goals, as well as multiple application possibilities" (228). A number of more or less closely related themes are dealt with in most of the pieces on human nature, though there is much variation involved, and the emphasis differs from piece to piece a great deal. Most common is perhaps the notion of providing "*principia* for the improvement of morality" (1). However, even leaving aside Kant's ethics in the strict sense of the word, this may mean anything from improving the morals of a young person to furthering the morality and freedom of the whole of humankind. These two goals are not unrelated, but while the former may exhaust itself in offering simple practical advice pertaining to life style, the latter has to do with the greater scheme of things and is often

connected with the heuristic idea of human progress, which in its turn may or may not be coupled with reflections on teleology and purposiveness. And the basic idea of improving morality may or may not be linked to Kant's explicitly expressed intention of contributing to a field that was useful for life, not only for school. As a consequence, the writings included in the present volume are marked more by a family resemblance than by any strictly definable standards. The editors' claim that the volume offers a "complete documentation" of Kant's writings "on the human being from an anthropological, biological, historical, and pedagogical point of view" (xiii) is perhaps overly optimistic; there are writings that have been omitted but could have been included, while others that do figure here seem to be out of place. The editors themselves admit that *Some Remarks on Ludwig Heinrich Jakob's Examination of Mendelssohn's Morning Hours of 1786* do not fit in squarely (xiii). Indeed, one wonders if they could not have been included in the volume on *Religion and Rational Theology* (1996) instead. There, *Some Remarks* would have stood next to *What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking*, another piece in which Kant contributed to the so-called "pantheism dispute", an acrimonious clash among German philosophers over Lessing's alleged pantheism.

In his "General Introduction" (1–17), Louden very usefully divides the writings in this volume into three groups, anthropology, history, and education, though in the main body of the volume the translations follow in a straightforward chronological sequence. Under "anthropology" Louden not surprisingly counts above all Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* of 1798, a book that is largely though loosely based on Kant's university lectures; this, incidentally, is the only large work included in this volume. However, Louden's account begins with the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* of 1764, a piece that is usually seen as an expression of Kant's pre-critical views on aesthetics and ethics. Nevertheless, though this writing could well have been included in a volume on aesthetics, it is by no means misplaced here, given that for the most part it does deal with "anthropological" themes such as the differences between the genders as well as among nationalities and races. What is not entirely clear is why Kant's own notes and additions to this essay (GSE, AA 20: 1–102) are not included in this volume as well; this is not explained, the reader is merely directed to the publication of a part of the additions in the Cambridge Edition volume *Notes and Fragments* (2005, 1–24).

Further included under the heading "anthropology" are five very brief pieces on medical topics, starting with the *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* of 1764, and further comprising Kant's *Review of Moscati's Work On the Corporeal Essential Differences Between the Structure of Animals and Humans* (1771), *A Note to Physicians* (1782), *On the Philosophers' Medicine of the Body* (1786), and *From Soemmerring's*

On the Organ of the Soul (1796). These writings deal with the study of the human being only in a general sense, since Kant was here mainly concerned with clarifying the relationship between the academic disciplines of philosophy and medicine. However, the fact that he sought to establish a connection between these two fields, thus opting for a psychosomatic approach while distancing himself from a strictly physiological one, does make these articles relevant to the study of human nature.

The last group of writings that Louden subsumes under “anthropology” consists of three essays on the races, *Of the Different Races of Human Beings* (1775), *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* (1785), and *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* (1788). These differ markedly from Kant’s other works that have been discussed so far, as they form no part of a “pragmatic anthropology” but belong to the very physiological branch of which Kant was mostly highly critical (6). Louden and later again the translators of these pieces in their respective introductions note that there is a racist tone or under-tone to these essays (“prejudices of an era”, 3), though Louden defends Kant by pointing to the fact that Kant was adverse to using racial criteria to justify the subjugation of peoples. In spite of the fact that Kant regarded the goal of civilizing savages as highly desirable, such an end did not, according to him, legitimize the violation of human rights (9–10). The bulk of the three pieces on the races can only be of a historical interest. Though it does raise conceptual and methodological questions, it mainly involves detailed discussions of highly technical issues such as the role of germs (*Keime*) in the development of the different human races, and it is intended as a contribution to the then raging debate between the proponents of “monogeneticism” and those of “polygeneticism”, i.e., to an argument over the question whether the human species has only one origin or multiple ones. However, especially the last piece, *On the Use of Teleological Principles*, is also philosophically relevant. Two years before the appearance of the *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, Kant here defended the legitimacy of the concept of purposiveness in science, stressing that it should serve as a heuristic principle, and distinguishing between different kinds of teleology. In passing, Kant also endorsed Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* which appeared in *Teutscher Merkur* in 1786 and which did much to popularize Kant’s philosophy in Germany. This essay, which deals with at least three different topics, thus amply illustrates the difficulties of neatly classifying Kant’s writings. And the editors are faced with a dilemma: include the essay with the third *Critique*, because that is where its philosophical importance lies, or place it alongside the two articles on race, because, after all, the greatest part of it does deal with the natural history of the human species. Obviously, either solution is possible, and they are both open to criticism.

Under the heading “history” Louden includes Kant’s three pieces on the philosophy of history, namely his *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784), his *Review of J. G. Herder’s Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity* (1785), and the *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786). As Louden explains, in these writings Kant took up with considerable reservations the Enlightenment’s notion of human progress. Unlike some of the more hopeful advocates of this idea, Kant did not think that automatic improvement was to be expected. For him humankind would have to labour hard for its own advancement, and there was no guarantee on the part of nature that we would move in the direction of greater freedom and a more advanced state of morality. Indeed, Kant insisted on the difficulties that a natural being would have to overcome when attempting to become a truly moral subject: by resorting to concepts such as “unsociable sociability” Kant pointed to the contorted path humankind would have to follow, more unwittingly than knowingly, more forced on human beings by nature than freely chosen by rational actors. Given that many of these basic notions appear in a number of other writings by Kant, the reader is left wondering, why, e.g., Kant’s essay *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* was left out of this volume. Unfortunately, the editors offer no explanation, though in their notes they do provide a fairly extensive list of Kant’s writings that are relevant to his philosophy of history (488).

The two pieces on education included in this volume, the *Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum* (1776/1777) and the *Lectures on Pedagogy*, published by Kant’s younger colleague Friedrich Theodor Rink in 1803, contradict the writings on the philosophy of history in one very important respect. As Louden himself points out, the essays on history assume that human progress is the unintended result of selfish actions, while the writings on education show how “the species achieves progress through the intentional development of its own capacities and talents” (15). Nevertheless, there is common ground, provided by the idea that the non-sectarian, cosmopolitan attitudes and moral values that were to be inculcated into pupils would ultimately contribute to the perfection of humankind.

For the sake of completeness it should be mentioned that the volume also includes the last writing that Kant himself published, namely the *Postscript to Christian Gottlieb Mielcke’s Lithuanian–German and German–Lithuanian Dictionary* of 1800. This usually neglected, roughly one page long piece can be subsumed under “anthropology” insofar as Kant here makes a link between language and culture, arguing that the former preserves valuable historical information. He also shows great respect towards the linguistic and cultural rights of ethnic minorities, and he fittingly ends this piece by advocating the preservation and even cultivation of the Lithuanian and Polish languages in Prussia.

The present volume, produced with great care, includes all the editorial material that one has come to expect from the Cambridge Edition. There is the usual German–English and English–German glossary, very informative introductions and endnotes which provide background information on the circumstances of the composition of each piece, on the particulars of the original publication, on the impact of the given writing, as well as brief summaries of the main ideas. The translations are almost all new for this edition, though some of them do owe a debt to earlier attempts, as the translators are quick to admit. As is usual in this series, the aim is to provide a literal yet readable translation. Special difficulties in the present volume arise in the translations of the writings on the races; the biological terminology employed by Kant is dealt with by resorting to extra linguistic notes and, indeed, the list of the original German words below the text is longer here than it is elsewhere.

Of course, translation being an art rather than an exact science, not all the translations are equally felicitous. One may start by pondering how accurate it is to render Kant's title *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* by the straightforward *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Translating the German “*Anthropologie*” by “anthropology” is well established practice and may seem unobjectionable. However, although these words are obvious cognates, they do differ significantly in their respective ordinary language uses. Only the expression “physical anthropology” offers no special problems for the translator. Otherwise, the English word, which is best translated into German as *Ethnologie*, has a far narrower connotation, and hence fails to cover much of what the German word means; normally, one would, e.g., not label any reflections on the mind-body problem (as they become manifest in Kant's discussion of the connection between medicine and philosophy) by the English word “anthropology”. One can thus meaningfully say “study of human nature [...] from an anthropological point of view” only in English; in German, the equivalent phrase would be a pleonasm. At least equally problematic is a translation of Kant's seemingly very peculiar use of “pragmatic” in this context. The issue is confused already by the fact that in his works on ethics, Kant opposed pragmatic to moral, while in his *Anthropologie* he opposed it to physiological, explicitly defining it as what a free-acting being makes of herself (231). And though last mentioned may be in accordance with the meaning of the ancient Greek word, such a connotation is more or less inexistent today, not least of all because the philosophical movement of Pragmatism has massively affected the usage of this term and its relatives. Unfortunately, translating “*pragmatisch*” with “cultural” or even “anthropological” and thus rendering the title of Kant's *Anthropologie* as *Study of Human Nature from an Anthropological Point of View* would not be wholly satisfactory either, since it would completely miss the dimension of being useful for life, which the erudite reader will

easily infer from her knowledge of the etymology of the Greek word. Perhaps future translators will come up with a more suitable solution.

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Johannes Keienburg: Immanuel Kant und die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft. [KSEH 164.] Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2011. 206 Seiten. 978-3-11-025930-8.

Johannes Keienburg stellt in seinem Buch den vielfältigen Begriff der Öffentlichkeit in Kants kritischer Philosophie in fünf Kapiteln dar. „Obwohl Kant den Begriff *Öffentlichkeit* in seinem schriftlichen Werk kein einziges Mal verwendet“ (184) hält Keienburg diesen Begriff für ein zentrales Element von Kants kritischer und politischer Philosophie. Ausgangspunkt des Buches ist eine semantische Analyse des gegenwärtigen Sprachgebrauchs des Öffentlichkeitsbegriffs und seiner systematischen Verortung in Kants kritischer Philosophie. Im ersten Kapitel werden verschiedene Öffentlichkeitsebenen und ihre Bedeutungsfelder in Kants politischer Theorie ausdifferenziert, und wird besonders das Publizitätsprinzip berücksichtigt, das Kant in seiner *Friedensschrift* als Prinzip des öffentlichen Rechts bezeichnet. Keienburg betont zu Recht, dass das Publizitätsprinzip als transzendente Formel des öffentlichen Rechts eine negative und eine positive Version enthält. Als negatives Prinzip besagt es, dass all jene politischen Maximen, die sich nicht veröffentlichen lassen, ungerecht sind. Die positive Dimension besagt, dass alle Maximen, die der Publizität bedürfen, um ihren Zweck nicht zu verfehlen, gerecht sind (vgl. ZeF, AA 08: 386). Die positive Version des Publizitätsprinzips braucht für ihre Erfüllung eine faktische Öffentlichkeit. Während bei der negativen Formel ein einzelnes Subjekt die Frage zu beantworten vermag, ob seine Maxime veröffentlicht werden kann, verlangt die positive Version des Publizitätsprinzips eine faktische Öffentlichkeit, um ihren Zweck nicht zu verfehlen (vgl. 26).

Keienburg vertritt die Hauptthese, dass sich der Ursprung des kantischen Öffentlichkeitsbegriffs nicht in Kants politischer Theorie, nicht im erwähnten Publizitätsprinzip, sondern vielmehr in seiner theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie befindet (vgl. 184). Das zweite, dritte und vierte Kapitel des Buches zielt darauf ab, dies durch eine umfassende Analyse der kantischen theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie zu zeigen. Keienburgs These, dass Kants theoretische Vernunft im Wesentlichen eine öffentliche Vernunft ist, wird im zweiten und dritten Kapitel des Buches durch zwei Hauptargumente gerechtfertigt: Erstens sei der öffentliche Gebrauch der Vernunft für die Entwicklung der menschlichen